Factual Background

The present writ petition arose out of disciplinary proceedings initiated against Dr. Tapas Kumar Das, an Associate Professor of Astrophysics at the Harish Chandra Research Institute (HCRI), Allahabad, following multiple allegations of sexual harassment made by female students and post-doctoral researchers working under his supervision. The complaints related to incidents allegedly occurring between 2013 and 2016 and included accusations of unwelcome physical contact, sexually coloured remarks, inappropriate late-night meetings in his office, unsolicited personal messages through social media, sending links to pornographic material, and abuse of his position of authority over young women pursuing academic research under him. Several complainants asserted that they had delayed reporting the incidents due to fear of professional repercussions and the power imbalance between themselves and the petitioner.

The Internal Committee (IC) conducted an inquiry and concluded that the petitioner had engaged in repeated acts of sexual harassment over an extended period. The Committee observed that as many as ten women had complained against him, several allegations were corroborated by documentary evidence or witness accounts, and the petitioner had exploited his supervisory position to harass female students. Although the IC acknowledged that none of the complaints had been filed within the limitation period prescribed under Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”), it nevertheless proceeded with the inquiry considering the seriousness and multiplicity of the allegations. It recommended several disciplinary measures, including withholding increments and promotions, suspension, prohibiting him from supervising female students, removing him from institutional committees, relocating his office to a transparent workspace, and requiring him to undergo gender sensitisation programmes.

The Governing Council of HCRI subsequently considered the IC’s report and, after reviewing the available material and the petitioner’s responses, imposed the penalty of “Censure” and permanently prohibited him from supervising female students, post-doctoral fellows, or research associates. Challenging these findings, the petitioner approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the inquiry suffered from serious procedural irregularities, including failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the POSH Act and the principles of natural justice. He also argued that the complaints were hopelessly barred by limitation under Section 9 of the POSH Act and therefore could not have been entertained by the IC.

Court’s Analysis

The High Court first examined whether the inquiry conducted by the IC satisfied the procedural requirements prescribed under Section 11 of the POSH Act and Rule 7 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013. The Court reiterated that although the POSH Act is a welfare legislation intended to provide effective protection against workplace sexual harassment, inquiries conducted under it must nevertheless conform to the principles of natural justice. The Court observed that while the petitioner had been furnished with copies of the complaints, several crucial procedural safeguards had not been followed. There was no indication that the complainants’ statements had been formally recorded before the IC, no material to show that the petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the complainants or otherwise challenge the evidence against him, and no evidence that oral hearings had been conducted before arriving at findings of guilt. Since the IC exercises powers akin to those of a civil court during inquiry proceedings, these safeguards could not be dispensed with merely because the proceedings arose under a special statute.

The Court next addressed the issue of limitation under Section 9 of the POSH Act. It acknowledged that complaints are ordinarily required to be filed within three months from the date of the incident, extendable by a further three months for recorded reasons. The petitioner relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in X v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti to argue that complaints filed beyond this period were liable to be rejected at the threshold. However, the High Court distinguished the facts before it by observing that allegations of workplace sexual harassment frequently involve victims who delay reporting due to fear, vulnerability, and unequal power dynamics. The Court noted that the complaints in the present case contained serious allegations, including physical advances, coercive late-night meetings, sexually coloured conversations, and abuse of supervisory authority. Such complaints could not be mechanically rejected merely because of delay without first examining whether sufficient explanation existed for the delayed reporting. Accordingly, the ICC was required to undertake a reasoned examination of limitation before deciding whether the complaints should proceed further.

While recognising the gravity of the allegations, the Court emphasised that substantive justice could not come at the expense of procedural fairness. The failure of the IC to follow the mandatory inquiry procedure rendered both its report and the disciplinary action based upon it legally unsustainable.

Order of the Court

The Allahabad High Court set aside the disciplinary order dated 9 July 2017 as well as the findings of the Internal Committee. Rather than exonerating the petitioner or dismissing the complaints as time-barred, the Court remitted the matter to the IC for fresh consideration. It directed the Committee to first determine, through a reasoned order, whether the complaints were maintainable in view of Section 9 of the POSH Act after considering the dates of the alleged incidents, the timing of the complaints, and the complainants’ explanations for the delay. Only if the IC concluded that the complaints were maintainable could it proceed with a fresh inquiry strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the POSH Act, the 2013 Rules, and the principles of natural justice. The Court directed that this preliminary decision be taken within eight weeks.

Written by Adv. K. Sri Hamsa