Facts of the Case

The case originated from an FIR lodged on October 10, 2018, by the complainant (opposite party no. 2) at Taltala Police Station, alleging offences punishable under Sections 354/114 of the Indian Penal Code against four accused persons, including the petitioner. The complaint stated that the accused persons, acting in concert, had harassed her at her workplace. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed a charge sheet, not under Section 354 IPC, but under Section 509 IPC, relating to insulting the modesty of a woman. The trial court took cognizance of the matter and proceeded accordingly.

The complainant had been employed with Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd., joining its Delhi office in 2015 as a trainee reporter, later transferring to Kolkata in December 2015, and resigning in July 2017. Over a year later, in October 2018, she lodged the present FIR, alleging harassment and bullying during her employment. She also filed a complaint under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, before her former employer’s Internal Committee (IC). Although this complaint was time-barred, the IC nonetheless conducted an inquiry and, after a detailed examination, found no evidence to substantiate her claims, exonerating the petitioner. Despite this, the criminal proceedings under Section 509 IPC continued.

Contentions of the Petitioner

Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, argued that the allegations were baseless and motivated. He contended that the complaint had been lodged after a significant delay of over one year and two months since the complainant’s resignation, suggesting mala fides and professional rivalry as the underlying reasons. He emphasized that neither the FIR nor the charge sheet contained any specific allegation of words, gestures, or acts that could amount to insulting the complainant’s modesty, which is an essential ingredient under Section 509 IPC.

The petitioner’s counsel highlighted that the IC had already conducted a detailed inquiry under the 2013 Act and had exonerated the petitioner of sexual harassment allegations due to lack of evidence. Since this finding was not challenged by the complainant, it attained finality. The petitioner argued that the continuation of criminal proceedings, despite such exoneration, amounted to abuse of the process of law. It was further submitted that vague references to “harassment” and “abuse” could not satisfy the legal requirement of intent or knowledge necessary to constitute an offence under Section 509 IPC. The petition relied on precedents such as Vijay Choudhary v. State of Maharashtra, Ashish Chauhan v. State (NCT of Delhi), and Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, to assert that criminal proceedings cannot continue when departmental proceedings on the same facts have exonerated the accused on merits.

Contentions of the Respondent

Counsel for the complainant, opposed the petition. He argued that the complainant had suffered harassment, humiliation, and mental agony at her workplace, leading to depression. The petitioner, being in a position of authority, allegedly subjected her to continuous harassment, aided by a female colleague. It was submitted that several other trainees had also complained against the petitioner, establishing a pattern of harassment.

He argued that the ingredients of Section 509 IPC were sufficiently made out in the FIR and case diary, and the matter ought to proceed to trial to allow witnesses to testify. He stressed that the IC’s exoneration could not override the criminal proceedings, as the two processes were independent. The IC findings, he pointed out, were not admissible in evidence due to statutory bars under Sections 16 and 17 of the 2013 Act. The respondent’s counsel maintained that the allegations were serious, involved sexual harassment at the workplace, and could not be quashed at the threshold. He prayed for dismissal of the petition, labeling the petitioner as a habitual offender.

Court’s Observations

Justice Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee examined whether the essential ingredients of Section 509 IPC were present in the allegations. The Court noted that for an offence under Section 509 IPC, there must be an intention to insult the modesty of a woman, either through words, gestures, sounds, or intrusion upon privacy. In the present case, neither the FIR nor the statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC disclosed any specific acts or gestures by the petitioner that could amount to insulting the complainant’s modesty. The allegations were confined to general claims of “harassment” and “abuse,” without any details of words or conduct demonstrating criminal intent.

The Court emphasized that mere references to harassment or bullying at the workplace, without describing the mode, manner, or intent, cannot constitute an offence under Section 509 IPC. It observed that the prosecution witnesses themselves did not support the complainant’s case in material particulars. The Court further noted that the IC had already conducted an independent inquiry and had exonerated the petitioner, finding her allegations unsubstantiated. Given that the standard of proof in departmental proceedings is lower than that in criminal trials, an exoneration in the former strongly indicated that no criminal offence could be made out on the same facts.

Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal (2011) 3 SCC 581, the Court held that when a person is exonerated on merits in departmental proceedings, a criminal prosecution on the same facts cannot continue. It concluded that allowing the present case to proceed would amount to abuse of the process of law, particularly when the possibility of conviction appeared bleak.

Court’s Order

The Calcutta High Court allowed the revision petition (CRR 2610 of 2019) and quashed the criminal proceedings arising out of G.R. Case No. 1153 of 2018 pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. The Court held that the allegations made in the FIR and charge sheet did not fulfill the essential ingredients of Section 509 IPC, and the continuation of trial would be unjustified. Urgent certified copies of the order were directed to be supplied to the parties as per procedure.

Written by Adv. Deeksha Rai