Facts of the Case
The petitioner was accused of committing rape on the de facto complainant by promising marriage between 2014 and 2019. The de facto complainant alleged that the petitioner subjected her to rape during this period. The petitioner and the complainant were in a consensual relationship, with the alleged incidents of rape supposedly occurring between May 30, 2014, and April 20, 2019. However, the FIR was filed only in 2019, raising concerns about the credibility of the complaint, especially considering that there had been no contact between the parties for over three years before the complaint was made.
Contention of the Petitioner
The petitioner contended that the allegations of rape were baseless. He argued that the sexual relations between him and the de facto complainant were consensual, and that there was no coercion involved. He pointed out the significant delay in filing the FIR (five years after the alleged incident) and noted that there had been no contact between the petitioner and the complainant for over three years. Moreover, the petitioner referred to the fact that the complainant had previously filed a complaint with the Women Cell in 2016 but had withdrawn it after receiving assurances from him regarding marriage. He claimed that this behaviour indicated that the complainant’s allegations were motivated by ulterior motives, possibly related to personal grudges or attempts to exert pressure for illegal demands.
Contention of the Respondent
The respondent (the de facto complainant) maintained that she had been subjected to rape by the petitioner, who had promised to marry her. She claimed that the sexual relations were non-consensual, and that the petitioner had taken advantage of her trust. The respondent pointed out that the petitioner’s actions caused her significant emotional and psychological harm, and the failure to file the FIR earlier was attributed to her belief that the petitioner would eventually marry her, as assured by him on several occasions. She further argued that the delay in filing the complaint should not be considered as an indication that her allegations were false.
Court’s Observation
The Kerala High Court noted a significant shift in how society perceives sexual assault allegations, particularly in the context of Indian society. The Court observed that the old belief—that women would not make false allegations of sexual assault due to societal pressures—no longer held universally true. The Court stated, “In cases where sexual assault has been alleged, the said concept has been carried for the past so many years, on the premise that, in Indian society, any girl would not make any allegation of sexual assault or any other mode of misconduct against a person… However, in recent years, this concept seems to be diluted… so as to settle a score and also to compel the persons against whom allegations are made to heed the illegal demands of the complainants.”
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010), noting that traditionally, girls in India were reluctant to admit incidents of sexual assault because they feared social ostracism. However, the Court pointed out that these concerns should not lead to blind acceptance of allegations without scrutinizing the facts of each case individually. It observed that in the present case, the delay in filing the FIR, coupled with the lack of contact between the parties for three years, raised doubts about the credibility of the complaint.
Court’s Decision
The Court ultimately quashed all the proceedings against the petitioner, citing a lack of substantive evidence to support the allegations of rape. The Court reasoned that the relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant was consensual, and the overt acts alleged in the complaint could not be classified as rape. The delay in filing the complaint, combined with the fact that the complainant had not pursued earlier complaints, further supported the Court’s conclusion that the allegations lacked merit. The Court emphasized that the consent of the complainant had not been vitiated by any misconception of facts and that the relationship was purely consensual in nature.
The Court also took into account the complainant’s affidavit, which stated that she had no objection to quashing the proceedings against the petitioner. As a result, the Court allowed the petition for quashing and dismissed the criminal proceedings, stating, “Therefore, the relationship between the defacto complainant and petitioner was purely consensual in nature… no materials made out in this matter to attract the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC.” The proceedings in the Sessions Court, arising from the case, were accordingly quashed.
Credits: Deeksha Rai